文章摘要：The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges continue to strengthen ex-post supervisionwith the development and improvement of the Chinese capital market. The number of annual report comment letters (ARCLs) issued by them has been increasing over the years. Focusing on the financial expertise of board secretaries, who are directly responsible for disclosure, this paper thoroughly explores whether such expertise can impact regulatory inquiries. We document that financial expert board secretaries significantly reduces the likelihood, frequency, and characters of firms’ receipt of ARCLs and the likelihood of firms’ delay of responses to ARCLs. Further, we find that the influence of board secretaries with financial expertise on ARCLs mainly exists in the non-state-owned enterprises and enterprises with a poor internal or external governance environment. In addition, if the board secretary serves as the firm’s CFO or serves earlier than the CFO (CEO), the main effects are more pronounced. The mechanism test results show that financial expert board secretaries can reduce the accrual-based earnings management. Overall, this research not only reveals the impact of top managers’ characteristics on regulatory inquiries from the perspective of board secretaries but also has important practical significance for understanding the role of board secretaries in improving firms’ information disclosure quality.
作者简介：全怡：威尼斯wns885566副教授、硕士生导师。
周聪（通讯作者）：威尼斯wns885566博士生。
鲍镕江：威尼斯wns885566硕士生。
龙立：湖南工商大学威尼斯wns885566副教授。
期刊简介：China Journal of Accounting Studies（简称CJAS）是中国会计学会主办、国际学术出版集团泰勒与弗朗西斯出版集团旗下Routledge出版社出版的英文学术期刊（季刊），面向国内和国外同时发行，中文刊名为《中国会计研究》。CJAS主要刊发中国主题会计理论和实践的原创性研究成果、中国学者的全球主题最前沿会计理论研究成果以及带有中国元素的其他会计学术论文，是在《会计研究》的基础上，按照定位更高、要求更严、优中选优的思路创办的、集中展示中国前沿会计理论研究成果的学术平台。
